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Money is a secondary reinforcer commonly used across a range of disciplines in experimental 
paradigms investigating reward learning and decision-making. The effectiveness of monetary 
reinforcers during aversive learning and associated neural basis, however, remains a topic of 
debate. Specifically, it is unclear if the initial acquisition of aversive representations of monetary 
losses depends on similar neural systems as more traditional aversive conditioning that involves 
primary reinforcers. This study contrasts the efficacy of a biologically defined primary reinforcer 
(shock) and a socially defined secondary reinforcer (money) during aversive learning and its 
associated neural circuitry. During a two-part experiment, participants first played a gambling game 
where wins and losses were based on performance to gain an experimental bank. Participants 
were then exposed to two separate aversive conditioning sessions. In one session, a primary 
reinforcer (mild shock) served as an unconditioned stimulus (US) and was paired with one of 
two colored squares, the conditioned stimuli (CS+ and CS−, respectively). In another session, a 
secondary reinforcer (loss of money) served as the US and was paired with one of two different 
CS. Skin conductance responses were greater for CS+ compared to CS− trials irrespective of 
type of reinforcer. Neuroimaging results revealed that the striatum, a region typically linked with 
reward-related processing, was found to be involved in the acquisition of aversive conditioned 
response irrespective of reinforcer type. In contrast, the amygdala was involved during aversive 
conditioning with primary reinforcers, as suggested by both an exploratory fMRI analysis and a 
follow-up case study with a patient with bilateral amygdala damage. Taken together, these results 
suggest that learning about potential monetary losses may depend on reinforcement learning 
related systems, rather than on typical structures involved in more biologically based fears.
Keywords: fear conditioning, striatum, amygdala, reinforcement, aversive learning, reward, insula
integrity of the amygdala (for review see Phelps and LeDoux, 2005). 
Although potential monetary losses can modulate decision-making 
under risk (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), it is unclear if the initial 
acquisition of aversive representations of monetary losses depends 
on overlapping systems as more traditional aversive conditioning 
that involves primary reinforcers. The goal of this study is to pro-
vide a direct comparison between a biologically defined primary 
reinforcer (i.e., shock) and a socially defined secondary reinforcer 
(i.e., money) and their respective influences in the neural circuits 
and expression of aversive learning.
The human striatum has been linked to reward-related learning 
with both primary (e.g., juice; O’Doherty et al., 2004) and second-
ary (e.g., money; Kirsch et al., 2003) reward in several investigations 
where either one type of reinforcer or another are presented (for 
review see Knutson and Cooper, 2005; Delgado, 2007). More recently, 
blood oxygenation level dependent (BOLD) responses in the dorsal 
striatum have been shown to correlate with prediction errors in a 
task involving multiple types of reward presented within the same 
experiment (juice and money reinforcers; Valentin and O’Doherty, 
2009). With respect to aversive conditioning, striatum BOLD signals 
have been found to correlate with learning in separate tasks that using 
either primary (shock) or secondary (money) reinforcers (For review 
INTRODUCTION
Monetary rewards are a common reinforcer used in experimental 
paradigms across a range of disciplines, from behavioral econom-
ics to neuropsychological investigations of learning (e.g., Knutson 
et al., 2003; Delgado et al., 2006; Vohs et al., 2006). Money is a 
secondary reinforcer (i.e., reinforcers which acquire their proper-
ties through association with a primary reinforcer) that in many 
circumstances within human society could have similar or even 
stronger effects on behavior than more well characterized primary 
reinforcers (i.e., reinforcers that are innate to the organism and 
elicit a reaction) such as liquids and food. The use of monetary 
reinforcers are of particular interest in experiments that probe the 
neural correlates of learning and decision-making, since the value 
of money can be positive or negative depending on the context 
in which it is presented. Across such studies, the human striatum 
has been identified as a key region involved in reward-related pro-
cessing that facilitates reward learning and goal-directed behaviors 
(Montague and Berns, 2002; Knutson and Cooper, 2005; Delgado, 
2007; Rangel et al., 2008). Less is known about the effectiveness of 
money during aversive processing and its neural basis, particularly 
aversive conditioning in humans, which has mostly relied on pri-
mary reinforcers such as shock and found to be  dependent on the 
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was not analyzed because of a lack of behavioral responses. An 
additional six participants only showed conditioning during the 
session with shock, while five participants only showed responses 
during the conditioning session with monetary loss. Thus, final 
analysis was performed on 15 participants (7 F/8 M; mean age 
22.13, SD = 3.09) who showed evidence of affective learning dur-
ing both primary and secondary aversive conditioning sessions. 
Participants responded to posted advertisement and all participants 
gave informed consent. The experiments were approved by the 
University Committee on Activities Involving Human Subjects.
PROCeDURe
The experiment consisted of three experimental blocks (Figure 1). 
First, participants were exposed to a gambling session (adapted 
from Delgado et al., 2000) in order to acquire a financial endow-
ment, or an “experimental bank.” Participants were then involved 
in two separate aversive conditioning sessions (adapted from 
Delgado et al., 2006) which were counterbalanced with respect to 
order of presentation across participants. In one block, referred 
to as the primary session due to the nature of the reinforcer, the 
US was a mild shock to the wrist and resembled traditional aver-
sive conditioning human paradigms (e.g., Phelps et al., 2004). In 
another block, referred to as secondary session, a monetary loss 
served as the US and would be extracted from their experimental 
bank. In the gambling session, participants were told they were 
playing a “card-guessing” game, where the objective was to deter-
mine if the value of a given card was higher or lower than the 
number five. During each trial, a question mark was presented in 
the center of the “card,” indicating that participants had 2 s to make 
a response. Using a MRI compatible response unit, participants 
made a 50/50 choice regarding the potential outcome of the trial. 
The outcome was either higher (6, 7, 8, 9) or lower (1, 2, 3, 4) than 
five. The outcome was then displayed for 500 ms, followed by a 
feedback arrow (which indicated positive or negative feedback) 
for another 500 ms and an inter-trial interval of 13 s before the 
onset of the next trial. A correct guess led to the display of a green 
upward arrow indicating a monetary reward of $4.00 (reward tri-
als), while an incorrect guess led to the display of a red downward 
see Delgado et al., 2008). Thus, it is plausible that the human striatum 
may be involved in the acquisition of a conditioned response irrespec-
tive of type of reinforcer. The direct comparison of striatum signals 
within aversive conditioning with multiple aversive unconditioned 
stimuli, however, has not yet been investigated.
Aversive conditioning studies in humans typically use primary 
reinforcers and depend on the integrity of the amygdala (for review 
see Phelps and LeDoux, 2005). In contrast, the use of monetary 
reinforcers in aversive paradigms has yielded less consistent results. 
For instance, some fMRI studies have reported changes in amyg-
dala activation in response to, or expectation of, monetary losses 
(e.g., Breiter et al., 2001; Yacubian et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2009), 
while others have failed to do so (e.g., Seymour et al., 2007; see 
Delgado et al., 2008 for review). These findings are in accordance 
with neuropsychological investigations of risky decision-making 
involving monetary losses which have also reached mixed results. 
In such studies, amygdala lesions have been shown to affect loss 
aversion (De Martino et al., 2010), and lead to a lack of anticipa-
tory skin conductance responses (SCRs) in a risky gambling task 
(Bechara et al., 1999), while sparing biases to increase risk seeking 
behaviors when monetary gambles are framed as losses (Talmi et al., 
2009). One way to potentially understand the mixed contributions 
of monetary reinforcers in aversive contexts is to probe the use of 
monetary loss as an unconditioned stimulus (US) during a purely 
aversive conditioning paradigm, with the goal of understanding if 
conditioning via monetary loss will depend on similar mechanisms 
used for the acquisition of fears derived from more biologically 
meaningful stimuli such as shocks.
We conducted an event-related fMRI study to investigate com-
mon and distinct neural substrates underlying aversive condition-
ing with primary and secondary reinforcers. In this experiment, 
participants were first instructed to play a gambling game where 
they could win or lose money based on their performance. The 
purpose of the game was to give participants a monetary endow-
ment, ensuring that each participant had an experimental bank. 
Immediately following the gambling game, participants were 
then subjected to two separate aversive conditioning sessions. In 
one session, a primary reinforcer (i.e., mild shock to the wrist) 
served as an US and was paired with one of two colored squares, 
the conditioned stimuli (sCS+ and sCS−, respectively). In another 
session, a secondary reinforcer (i.e., loss of money, −$6.00, which 
was extracted from their experimental bank) served as the US and 
was paired with one of two different colored squares. This design 
allowed for the extraction of a conditioned response for each type 
of reinforcer in its separate learning context, thus allowing for the 
isolation of the independent effect of each reinforcer on affective 
learning within an individual (Delgado et al., 2006).
MaTeRIals aND MeThODs
PaRTICIPaNTs
Thirty-two participants were enrolled in this study (19 F/13 M; 
mean age 22.81, SD = 3.58). Participants’ inclusion in final data 
analysis for neuroimaging purposes was dependent on their behav-
ioral performance a priori, that is, their ability to demonstrate suc-
cessful conditioning with both primary and secondary reinforcers 
as assessed by SCR (see Physiological Set-up, Assessment, and 
Behavioral Analysis). Using this criteria, data from 6 participants 
Figure 1 | Depiction of aversive conditioning components of 
experimental paradigm. Participants are presented with two 
counterbalanced aversive conditioning sessions following a gambling game 
where they earn a monetary endowment. (A) In the first session, the 
unconditioned stimulus is a mild electric shock (primary reinforcer) which is 
paired with a colored square (sCS+). (B) In the second session, the 
unconditioned stimulus is a monetary loss (−$6.00), which is paired with a 
different colored square (mCS+) and detracted from the total sum earned 
during the gambling game.
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 stimulator charged by a stabilized current was used. The level of 
shock was set by the participants via a work up procedure that 
ensured the shocks were “uncomfortable,” but not painful. Within 
this procedure, participants were first given a mild shock (10 V, 
200 ms, 50 pulses/s) and gradually increased until the participant 
signaled so (maximum level of 60 V).
The order of the aversive conditioning sessions, as well as the 
color of the squares across all four CSs, was counterbalanced across 
participants. At the end of the experiment, participants filled out 
post-experimental questionnaires that assessed subjective feelings 
of intensity and valence toward all CSs. Specifically, participants 
were given a seven point likert scale and asked how intense their 
emotion or experience was upon seeing the particular colored 
square (seven being the most intense) and how bad a colored 
square was (seven being the worst). Participants were also given 
a questionnaire containing several gambles with the purpose of 
assessing individual differences in risk preferences (Holt and Laury, 
2002).
PhysIOlOgICal seT-UP, assessMeNT, aND BehavIORal aNalysIs
Skin conductance responses were acquired from the participant’s 
middle phalanges of the second and third fingers in the left hand 
via shielded Ag–AgCl electrodes which were grounded through an 
RF filter panel. Data acquisition was performed with a BIOPAC 
systems skin conductance module and AcqKnowledge software 
was used to analyze SCR waveforms. The level of SCR response 
was assessed as the base to peak difference for an increase in the 
0.5 to 4.5-s window following the onset of a CS, the blue or yel-
low square (see LaBar et al., 1995). A minimum response criterion 
of 0.02 μS was used with lower responses scored as 0. Responses 
were square-root transformed prior to statistical analysis to reduce 
skewness (LaBar et al., 1998). Responses that were three SD from 
the individual participant’s mean responses were excluded due to 
concerns of excessive motion. Acquired SCRs through the two aver-
sive conditioning sessions were then averaged per participant, per 
type of trial (e.g., CS+, CS−). Trials in which the CS+ was paired 
with a shock or monetary loss were separated from analysis so only 
SCRs to the CS+ (without US) were included.
A repeated measures ANOVA with type of aversive condition-
ing session (primary or secondary reinforcer) and type of CS (CS+ 
and CS−) as within subjects factor was then conducted. Two-tailed 
paired t-tests were used to compare activity of CS+ versus CS− trials 
within session post hoc to demonstrate effective conditioning within 
a specific aversive conditioning session. Participants’ inclusion in 
final data analysis was dependent on their behavioral performance, 
that is, their ability to demonstrate successful conditioning with 
both primary and secondary reinforcers as assessed by SCRs. More 
specifically, participants had to show a greater response for CS+ 
compared to CS− trials during both sessions. Fifteen participants 
met this criterion and were included in the final analysis.
Additional behavioral analysis was conducted by scoring the 
subjective ratings of intensity and valence across type of session 
and type of CS using a repeated measures ANOVA and post hoc two-
tailed paired t-tests. Analysis of the gambling session was limited 
since (a) the main purpose of the gambling session was to allow 
the participant to earn an experimental bank and (b) results for the 
card-guessing game have been previously published with respect to 
arrow indication a monetary loss of −$2.00 (punishment trials). 
Each trial was 16 s and participants played one block of the game 
containing 17 trials for each condition (reward and punishment). 
Unbeknownst to participants, the outcomes were predetermined 
ensuring a 50% reinforcement rate and a fixed profit across par-
ticipants. Participants were initially told they were guaranteed $25 
for performance in the scanner and that anything they would earn 
in the game was theirs to keep. At the end of the gambling session, 
a screen appeared congratulating the participant for their total 
earnings of $59.00 ($25 guaranteed amount plus the additional 
sum of $34 earned during the game) and informing them that the 
second part was about to start.
Following the gambling game, participants were exposed to 
two aversive conditioning sessions with either shock or monetary 
reinforcers (Figure 1). One session was referred to as primary ses-
sion because it involved a primary reinforcer (shock). The other 
was referred to as secondary session because it involved a second-
ary reinforcer (money). In the primary session, participants were 
presented with two colored squares (e.g., red and opaque) which 
served as the CS. Both CS were presented for 6 s, followed by a 12-s 
inter-trial interval. The US was a mild shock to the wrist, which 
lasted 200 ms and co-terminated with the CS. In this partial rein-
forcement design, one colored square (e.g., red) was paired with 
the shock (CS+) on about 33% of the CS+ trials, while another 
colored square (e.g., opaque) was never paired with the US (CS−). 
Participants were instructed that they would see different colored 
squares and occasionally receive a mild shock. Participants were 
not told about the contingencies and had to demonstrate successful 
affective learning (as assessed by SCRs) to be included in the final 
analysis. There were 30 total trials broken down into 12 CS− trials 
and 18 CS+ trials, of which 6 were paired with the US.
The secondary session was similar to the primary one, except 
that the US was a monetary loss. During this session, participants 
were exposed to two different colored squares (e.g., blue and yellow) 
which served as the CS. One colored square (e.g., blue) was paired 
with the monetary loss (CS+) on about 33% of the CS+ trials, while 
another colored square (e.g., opaque) was never paired with the US 
(CS−). The monetary loss was depicted by the symbol −$6.00 writ-
ten in red font and projected inside the square for the last 500 ms. 
Participants were instructed that they would see different colored 
squares and occasionally an additional −$6.00 sign indicating that 
$6.00 were to be deducted from their “experimental bank” acquired 
in the gambling session. Participants were not told about the con-
tingencies and had to demonstrate successful affective learning (as 
assessed by SCRs) to be included in the final analysis. There were 
30 total trials broken down into 12 CS− trials and 18 CS+ trials, of 
which 6 were paired with the US. Finally, the monetary penalties 
accumulated in the aversive conditioning session resulted in a total 
loss of $36.00. To ensure that each participant was paid $60.00 
in compensation following post-experimental questionnaires and 
debriefing, participants performed a final round of the gambling 
game (with similar structure to the first game).
Delivery of the US varied according to the type of aversive 
conditioning session. In the secondary session, the monetary loss 
was conveyed visually. In the primary session, the mild shock was 
administered through a stimulating bar electrode attached with 
a Velcro strap to the right wrist. A Grass Medical Instruments 
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There were no differences between reward (M = 0.38, SE = 0.08) 
and  punishment (M = 0.40, SE = 0.09) trials during the session 
[t(14) = 0.77, p = 0.45]. Participants were motivated during perfor-
mance in the gambling game, however, as assessed by one sample 
t-tests during both reward [t(14) = 5.06, p < 0.0005] and punish-
ment [t(14) = 4.68, p < 0.0005] trials.
PhysIOlOgICal assessMeNT Of aveRsIve CONDITIONINg sessIONs
A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted with the SCR data 
to measure the success of aversive conditioning with both shock 
and monetary reinforcers in a group of 15 participants that 
showed physiological responses during both aversive condition-
ing sessions (Figure 2A). A main effect of CS (CS+ and CS−) was 
observed, suggesting that participants were able to learn the con-
tingencies irrespective of type of reinforcer used [F(1, 14) = 34.35, 
p < 0.0001]. This is supported by post hoc t-tests showing dif-
ferential responses between CS+ and CS− trials during both 
primary [t(14) = 3.88, p < 0.005] and secondary [t(14) = 4.83, 
p < 0.0005] sessions. Given the nature of the US properties and 
delivery, a main effect of session (primary and secondary) was 
also observed [F(1, 14) = 7.61, p < 0.05]. Importantly, however, 
no interaction was apparent [F(1, 14) = 0.18, p < 0.68; Figure 2B], 
suggesting that the conditioned response was strong irrespective 
of type of session.
sUBjeCTIve RaTINgs
Participants were administered likert scale questionnaires at the 
end of the experiment assessing their subjective perception of both 
the intensity and valence of the four CSs (sCS+, sCS−, mCS+, and 
mCS−). For intensity ratings, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed 
a main effect of CS [F(1, 14) = 105.64, p < 0.0001], with post hoc 
t-tests confirming differences during both primary [t(14) = 9.13, 
p < 0.0005] and secondary [t(14) = 8.26, p < 0.0005] sessions. 
No main effect of session [F(1, 14) = 0.01, p = 0.95], or inter-
action [F(1, 14) = 3.06, p = 0.10], were observed. For valence 
ratings, a repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
CS [F(1, 14) = 12.22, p < 0.005], with post hoc t-tests showing 
differences during both the primary [t(14) = 3.85, p < 0.005] and 
secondary [t(14) = 3.04, p < 0.01] sessions. No main effect of ses-
sion [F(1, 14) = 0.22, p = 0.65], or interactions [F(1, 14) = 3.20, 
p = 0.10], were observed.
NeUROIMagINg ResUlTs: sIMIlaRITIes IN NeURal CIRCUITRy
The main statistical map of interest was a conjunction analysis 
that investigated voxels commonly recruited during aversive con-
ditioning with primary and secondary reinforcers. Specifically, this 
contrast looked for voxels activated by a CS+ – CS− contrast which 
overlapped across both types of sessions. This contrast led to the 
identification of several regions (Table 1), including the medial 
frontal gyrus (BA 6), anterior insula, and the striatum bilaterally 
showing greater responses during trials that predicted a potentially 
aversive outcome (CS+ trials). Of particular interest was the activa-
tion of the striatum, a region typically involved in reward-related 
processing, which was recruited during aversive learning with both 
primary and secondary reinforcers. Mean beta weights extracted 
from the striatum ROIs revealed no interactions between type of 
session (primary or secondary) and CS (CS+, CS−) in both the 
neuroimaging (for review see Delgado, 2007) and SCR (Delgado 
et al., 2006). Nevertheless, SCRs were collected and analyzed for both 
reward and punishment trials using one sample t-tests to examine 
participants’ levels of engagement during the gambling session.
fMRI aCqUIsITION aND aNalysIs
A 3T Siemens Allegra head-only scanner and a Siemens standard 
head coil were used for data acquisition at NYU’s Center for Brain 
Imaging. Anatomical images were acquired using a T1-weighted 
protocol (256 × 256 matrix, 176 one-mm sagittal slices). Functional 
images were acquired using a single-shot gradient echo EPI sequence 
(TR = 2000 ms, TE = 20 ms, FOV = 192 cm, flip angle = 75°, 
bandwidth = 4340 Hz/px, echo spacing = 0.29 ms). Thirty-five 
contiguous oblique-axial slices (3 mm × 3 mm × 3 mm voxels) 
parallel to the AC-PC line were obtained. Analysis of imaging data 
was conducted using Brain Voyager software (Brain Innovation, 
Maastricht, The Netherlands). The data were initially corrected 
for motion (using a threshold of 2 mm or less), and slice scan time 
using sinc interpolation was applied. Further, spatial smoothing 
was performed using a three-dimensional Gaussian filter (4-mm 
FWHM), along with voxel-wise linear detrending and high-pass 
filtering of frequencies (three cycles per time course). Structural and 
functional data of each participant was then transformed to stand-
ard Talairach stereotaxic space (Talairach and Tournoux, 1988).
A random-effects analysis was performed on the aversive learn-
ing functional data using a general linear model (GLM) on 15 par-
ticipants. There were six different regressors, including four at the 
level of the CS that covered the primary session (sCS+ and sCS−) 
and the secondary session (mCS+ and mCS−) as well as two at US 
onset (shock or loss of money). The main statistical map of inter-
est was a conjunction analysis that investigated voxels commonly 
recruited during aversive conditioning with primary and secondary 
reinforcers. The conjunction analysis tests the conjunction null 
hypothesis where the requirement is simply that all comparisons or 
included contrasts are individually significant. Specifically, this con-
junction analysis contrasted all CS+ trials with CS− trials for both 
primary and secondary sessions separately and then produced a 
statistical parametric map (SPM) that represented commonly acti-
vated voxels between the two contrasts. This map was thresholded 
at p < 0.005 and used a cluster threshold with an extent of eight, 
suggesting that only clusters which are associated with a cluster level 
false positive rate of α = 0.05 are sufficient to remain in the analysis 
(Forman et al., 1995; Goebel et al., 2006). Mean beta weights were 
extracted from whole ROIs identified in this contrast for post hoc 
analysis and graphing for visualization purposes. Differences within 
sessions were assessed by probing the interaction of CS (CS+ and 
CS−) and session (primary and secondary) using the same thresh-
old criteria and correction method. Finally, an exploratory analysis 
was conducted to functionally identify an amygdala ROI using the 
contrast of sCS+ and sCS− during early acquisition of fear and an 
uncorrected threshold of p < 0.01.
ResUlTs
PhysIOlOgICal assessMeNT Of gaMBlINg sessION
Skin conductance responses were acquired during the gambling 
session for reward and punishment trials to assess the overall 
level of engagement by participants in the card-guessing game. 
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reinforcers was not observed in either ROI. No interactions or 
correlations with individual risk preferences were observed with 
the medial frontal gyrus (BA 6) and anterior insula ROIs also 
identified in this analysis.
NeUROIMagINg ResUlTs: DIffeReNCes IN NeURal CIRCUITRy
To examine differences in neural circuitry underlying aversive 
conditioning with primary and secondary reinforcers, we investi-
gated voxels in the whole-brain that showed an interaction of CS 
(CS+ and CS−) and session (primary and secondary). This contrast 
yielded activity in regions such as the cingulate gyrus, anterior 
and posterior insula and the somatosensory cortex (Table 2). All 
regions identified by the interaction showed a greater response to 
sCS+ compared to mCS+.
left ventral striatum ROI [F(1, 14) = 0.15, p = 0.7] and the larger 
right striatum ROI [F(1, 14) = 1.98, p = 0.18] which extended from 
ventral to more dorsal medial striatum.
Interestingly, the differential response between mCS+ and 
mCS− mean beta weights, that is the conditioned response dur-
ing the aversive conditioning session with secondary reinforcers 
(Figure 3), correlated with a measure of risk preference that was 
acquired outside the scanner (Holt and Laury, 2002). A Pearson’s 
correlation suggested that the greater the conditioning response 
in the monetary session, the greater the risk aversion in the par-
ticipant in the right striatum ROI (r = 0.602, p < 0.05) which also 
manifested as a trend approaching significance in the left striatum 
ROI (r = 0.496, p = 0.07). The same correlation for conditioned 
responses in the aversive conditioning session with primary 
Figure 2 | Skin conductance responses (SCrs) during aversive conditioning sessions. (A) SCR data suggests successful aversive conditioning with primary 
and secondary reinforcers such as monetary losses. (B) Similar conditioned responses (CS+ – CS−) are observed for both shock and money sessions.
Table 1 | Conjunction analysis investigating voxels commonly recruited during aversive conditioning with primary and secondary reinforcers 
(p < 0.005).
  Talairach coordinates  
region of activation Laterality x y z Voxels t-Stat
Paracentral lobule (BA 7) R 7 −34 55 175 −3.51
Medial frontal gyrus (BA 6) R 7 6 53 298 3.72
Medial frontal gyrus (BA 6) L −24 14 47 170 −3.45
Postcentral gyrus R 39 −20 47 265 −3.54
Precentral gyrus (BA 4) R 56 −9 26 761 −3.67
Cingulate gyrus (BA 23) L −1 −58 15 323 −3.48
Superior temporal gyrus (BA 42) R 58 −10 10 579 −3.72
Insula R 36 19 3 1157 3.65
Striatum R 10 4 5 241 3.67
Striatum L −8 3 3 149 3.77
BA, Brodmann area; L, left; R, right.
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NeUROPsyChOlOgICal Case sTUDy: BIlaTeRal aMygDala DaMage
A neuropsychological case study of a patient with bilateral amygdala 
damage was conducted to further investigate the involvement of 
the amygdala in aversive conditioning with loss of money as an US. 
Patient SP is a 62-year old, right-handed woman who underwent a 
temporal lobe resection to alleviate partial seizures originating in 
the right temporal lobe at age 48. Prior to the surgery, patient SP was 
also diagnosed with a lesion in her left amygdala (see Phelps et al., 
1998 for a detailed description of SP). The patient shows normal 
general intelligence according to the Weschsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale (WAIS-R: Verbal IQ = 100; Performance IQ = 92; Full Scale 
IQ = 97), but characteristic of patients with amygdala lesions, she 
Given the well characterized role of the amygdala in aversive condi-
tioning with primary reinforcers, we conducted an additional, explor-
atory, analysis aimed at identifying a functional ROI in the amygdala. 
Specifically, we performed a contrast of sCS+ and sCS− trials during 
the early phases of learning (the first half of trials only) using a leni-
ent threshold of p < 0.01 uncorrected and probed activity only in the 
amygdala (Figure 4). Parameter estimates extracted from this ROI 
revealed no effect of conditioning in the aversive conditioning session 
with secondary reinforcers [t(14) = −0.62, p = 0.54]. Although these 
results must be taken with caution due to the exploratory nature of 
this null result, it suggests that in this specific paradigm, the amygdala 
is not involved in acquiring a conditioned response to monetary losses.
Table 2 | Probing differences in neural circuitry underlying aversive conditioning with primary and secondary reinforcers with an interaction of CS 
(CS+ and CS−) and session (primary and secondary; p < 0.005).
  Talairach coordinates  
region of activation Laterality x y z Voxels t-Stat
Postcentral gyrus (BA 7) L −2 −49 67 417 13.01
Precentral gyrus (BA 4) L −22 −21 59 249 20.46
Medial frontal gyrus (BA 6) L −3 −8 49 426 14.07
Cingulate gyrus (BA 24) L −3 3 38 718 14.37
Insula L −47 −29 20 356 14.23
Insula L −39 −6 4 1157 13.87
Insula R 40 −1 −4 235 13.47
Uncus (BA 36) R 15 −9 −27 222 14.67
Cerebellum R 16 −46 −27 337 15.68
BA, Brodmann area; L, left; R, right.
Figure 3 | Bilateral activation of the striatum identified during both conditioning sessions using a conjunction analysis. The graphs are included for 
visualization only. Error bars reflect SE from the mean.
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the  monetary US session were well within one SD of the fMRI 
participants (M = 0.18, SD = 0.14). These results suggest SP shows 
impaired aversive conditioning with a shock US, but intact aversive 
conditioning with a monetary US in this experimental paradigm.
Patient SP was also administered a likert scale questionnaire 
(1–7) at the end of the experiment assessing her subjective per-
ception of both the intensity and valence of the four CSs (sCS+, 
sCS−, mCS+, and mCS−). For intensity ratings, Patient SP rated 
both mCS+ (4) and mCS− (5) higher than sCS+ (2) and sCS− (1). 
For valence ratings, she rated both mCS− (7) and sCS− (7) higher 
than mCS+ (1) and sCS+ (1). These results suggest that she “liked” 
the CS that predicted a safe, rather than negative outcome, while 
experiencing greater intensity upon seeing CS in the money rather 
than the shock session.
DIsCUssION
The goal of this study was to provide a direct comparison between 
a biologically defined primary reinforcer (i.e., shock) and a learned 
secondary reinforcer (i.e., money) and their respective influences 
in the neural circuits and expression of learning about fears. Using 
a modified Pavlovian fear conditioning paradigm (Delgado et al., 
2006), participants acquired the value of different CS during sepa-
rate learning sessions that used a primary or secondary reinforcer 
which were subjectively perceived as equally intense. The use of 
money as an US during aversive conditioning led to the expression 
of a conditioned response, similar to responses elicited by shock, 
as measured by SCRs. Irrespective of the type of reinforcer used 
during aversive learning, the striatum was found to be commonly 
involved in the acquisition of such conditioned response, suggesting 
a general role for the striatum in affective learning. In contrast, the 
amygdala was found to be more involved in aversive condition-
ing with primary compared to secondary reinforcers both in an 
demonstrates difficulties with measures of emotional processing 
including fear conditioning (e.g., Phelps et al., 1998; Anderson and 
Phelps, 2002).
Patient SP underwent the same procedure as previously described 
(Figure 1). First, she performed a gambling session to earn a mon-
etary bank. She was then exposed to two aversive conditioning 
sessions with the monetary loss session being administered first. As 
in the fMRI experiment, SCRs were acquired continuously during 
the conditioning sessions as a measure of sympathetic arousal to 
the CS presented, while subjective ratings of intensity and valence 
were collected at the end of the paradigm using a Likert scale from 
1 to 7. The level of SCR response was assessed as the base to peak 
difference for an increase in the 0.5 to 4.5-s window following the 
onset of a CS (see LaBar et al., 1995), with no minimum response 
criterion used and lack of responses being scored as 0. Responses 
were square-root transformed prior to statistical analysis to reduce 
skewness (LaBar et al., 1998).
As in previous reports (Phelps et al., 1998), patient SP failed 
to show a conditioned response during aversive conditioning 
with a shock US. Her conditioned response (CS+ SCR minus CS− 
SCR) was slightly less than zero (M = −0.01) indicating similar 
responding to the two CS stimuli. In contrast, when a monetary 
US was used, SP showed evidence for a stronger SCR to the CS+ 
than the CS−, indicating the acquisition of a conditioned response 
(M = 0.11; Figure 5). Although it is not possible to conduct reli-
able tests of significance with this case study, one can contrast 
SP’s data with the younger, neurologically intact participants of 
our fMRI study. Consistent with previous reports in patients with 
amygdala damage (Bechara et al., 1995; LaBar et al., 1995; Phelps 
et al., 1998), SP’s conditioned response during aversive conditioning 
with shock was more than a SD lower than the fMRI participants 
(M = 0.21, SD = 0.20). However, SP’s conditioned responses on 
Figure 4 | Blood oxygenation level dependent signals in the amygdala during early acquisition reveal a differential response between CS+ and CS− 
during the primary, but not the secondary aversive conditioning session.
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type of reinforcer (primary, secondary). It is also possible that 
 distinct regions within the striatum code for such valence differ-
ences (see Seymour et al., 2007). Within this context, a potential 
role for the striatum in aversive learning may be to participate in a 
circuitry responsible for updating value representations in order to 
change learned fears (Schiller and Delgado, 2010) and actively cope 
with the aversive context (LeDoux and Gorman, 2001).
Compared to other studies investigating aversive learning with 
secondary reinforcers (Kim et al., 2006; Seymour et al., 2007; 
Schlund and Cataldo, 2010), one key feature of this paradigm is the 
use of an experimental bank prior to the aversive conditioning ses-
sion (Delgado et al., 2006; Tom et al., 2007). This manipulation has 
the potential effect of increasing the significance of the monetary 
loss, in fact framing the loss as a real negative consequence since 
it is deducted from the participant’s own endowment. In contrast, 
in paradigms where participants do not have a sense of earning 
the monetary endowment, a loss may be experienced as a missed 
opportunity for a reward or the lesser of two outcomes. In support 
of this argument, striatum activity has been found to be stronger 
when participants earn the outcomes (Tricomi et al., 2004; Zink 
et al., 2004) and further modulated by changes in expected value 
in the context of a reference point (De Martino et al., 2009). This 
difference in the framing prior to the aversive conditioning session 
merits further investigation as a plausible mechanism responsible 
for differences in striatal responses to CS predicting monetary losses 
observed across different studies.
How money begins to acquire its conditioned reinforcer proper-
ties in humans could be akin to the process of second-order con-
ditioning typically studied in non-human animals. In Pavlovian 
second-order conditioning, a CS acquires conditioned properties 
(either positive or negative) due to an association with a first-order 
exploratory fMRI analysis and a follow-up case study with a patient 
with bilateral amygdala damage, suggesting that learning to “fear” 
a potential monetary loss may not depend on typical structures 
involved in more biologically based fears.
The human striatum has been identified as a critical struc-
ture for reward-related processing (Montague and Berns, 2002; 
Knutson and Cooper, 2005; Delgado, 2007; Rangel et al., 2008), 
with BOLD signals correlating with both the anticipation (e.g., 
Knutson et al., 2003) and receipt (e.g., Delgado et al., 2000) of 
reward, which is often attributed to a general role in reward-related 
learning and decision-making (for review see Montague and Berns, 
2002; O’Doherty, 2004; Rangel et al., 2008). Some observations of 
increases in BOLD signals to the anticipation of potentially aversive 
primary (Jensen et al., 2003) and secondary (Delgado et al., 2008) 
reinforcers have been observed, while a decrease in BOLD responses 
is sometimes reported at the receipt of monetary losses (Delgado 
et al., 2000) that resembles a prediction error signal (McClure et al., 
2003; O’Doherty et al., 2003). Similar fMRI responses in the stria-
tum have been observed when processing prediction errors during 
learning with primary (juice) and secondary (money) reinforcers 
in the same appetitive task (Valentin and O’Doherty, 2009). The 
current paper extends these results and demonstrates the involve-
ment of the human striatum during aversive learning with both 
primary (shock) and secondary (money) reinforcers.
The potential role of the human striatum in aversive learning, a 
region typically associated with reward processing, is unclear. There 
is evidence of striatum signals correlating with prediction errors 
when the context is aversive using both primary (Seymour et al., 
2004; Delgado et al., 2008) and secondary reinforcers (Seymour 
et al., 2007). It is possible that the striatum is involved in general 
affective learning irrespective of valence (appetitive, aversive) or 
Figure 5 | Skin conductance responses during aversive conditioning sessions with primary and secondary reinforcers in one patient with bilateral 
amygdala damage.
www.frontiersin.org May 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 71 | 9
Delgado et al. Aversive conditioning with primary and secondary reinforcers
Delgado, M. R., Li, J., Schiller, D., and 
Phelps, E. A. (2008). The role of the 
striatum in aversive learning and aver-
sive prediction errors. Philos. Trans. R. 
Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 363, 3787–3800.
Delgado, M. R., Nystrom, L. E., Fissell, 
C., Noll, D. C., and Fiez, J. A. (2000). 
Tracking the hemodynamic responses 
to reward and punishment in the stria-
tum. J. Neurophysiol. 84, 3072–3077.
Forman, S. D., Cohen, J. D., Fitzgerald, M., 
Eddy, W. F., Mintun, M. A., and Noll, 
D. C. (1995). Improved assessment of 
significant activation in functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI): 
use of a cluster-size threshold. Magn. 
Reson. Med. 33, 636–647.
Gewirtz, J. C., and Davis, M. (1997). 
Second-order fear  conditioning 
RefeReNCes
Anderson, A. K., and Phelps, E. A. 
(2002). Is the human amygdala 
critical for the subjective experi-
ence of emotion? Evidence of intact 
dispositional affect in patients with 
amygdala lesions. J. Cogn. Neurosci. 
14, 709–720.
Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Damasio, A. R., 
and Lee, G. P. (1999). Different con-
tributions of the human amygdala 
and ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
to decision-making. J. Neurosci. 19, 
5473–5481.
Bechara, A., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., 
Adolphs, R., Rockland, C., and 
Damasio, A. R. (1995). Double disso-
ciation of conditioning and declarative 
knowledge relative to the amygdala 
and hippocampus in humans. Science 
269, 1115–1118.
Brand, M., Grabenhorst, F., Starcke, 
K., Vandekerckhove, M. M., and 
Markowitsch, H. J. (2007). Role of 
the amygdala in decisions under 
ambiguity and decisions under risk: 
evidence from patients with Urbach-
Wiethe disease. Neuropsychologia 45, 
1305–1317.
Breiter, H. C., Aharon, I., Kahneman, 
D., Dale, A., and Shizgal, P. (2001). 
Functional imaging of  neural 
responses to expectancy and experi-
ence of monetary gains and losses. 
Neuron 30, 619–639.
Davis, F. C., Johnstone, T., Mazzulla, E. 
C., Oler, J. A., and Whalen, P. J. (2010). 
Regional response differences across 
the human amygdaloid complex dur-
ing social conditioning. Cereb. Cortex 
20, 612–621.
De Martino, B., Camerer, C. F., and 
Adolphs, R. (2010). Amygdala damage 
eliminates monetary loss aversion. Proc. 
Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107, 3788–3792.
De Martino, B., Kumaran, D., Holt, B., and 
Dolan, R. J. (2009). The neurobiology 
of reference-dependent value compu-
tation. J. Neurosci. 29, 3833–3842.
Delgado, M. R. (2007). Reward-related 
responses in the human striatum. Ann. 
N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1104, 70–88.
Delgado, M. R., Labouliere, C. D., and 
Phelps, E. A. (2006). Fear of losing 
money? Aversive conditioning with 
secondary reinforcers. Soc. Cogn. 
Affect. Neurosci. 1, 250–259.
CS which elicits a conditioned response (Holland and Rescorla, 
1975). The basolateral nucleus of the amygdala has been identified 
as a critical structure for the acquisition of a second-order condi-
tioned response (Hatfield et al., 1996; Gewirtz and Davis, 1997). 
However, this role appears limited to the acquisition of information 
about the motivational value of the first-order CS rather than the 
maintenance or expression of information already learned. This 
is illustrated by lesions of the basolateral nucleus of the amygdala 
after first-order, but before second-order training having no effect 
on the expression of second-order conditioned behaviors (Setlow 
et al., 2002). In the current experiment, money itself may be the 
first-order conditioned reinforcer, while the aversive conditioning 
session with money as the US would be an example of second-order 
conditioning. Since the acquisition of motivational information 
about the first-order CS, money, is well established, the second-
order expression may not be dependent on the integrity of the 
amygdala in humans.
Several investigations of the human amygdala support the 
assertion of a vast literature in non-human animals linking the 
amygdala with Pavlovian fear conditioning when primary rein-
forcers such as shock are used (for review see Phelps and LeDoux, 
2005; Hartley and Phelps, 2010). Although the amygdala has been 
linked with attaching value to purely social reinforcers such as 
faces (Davis et al., 2010), there is more uncertainty with respect 
to the role of the human amygdala and the processing of second-
ary reinforcers such as money. While some neuroimaging studies 
find changes in BOLD signals in the amygdala correlating with 
the expectation or actual receipt of monetary losses (e.g., Breiter 
et al., 2001; Yacubian et al., 2006; Smith et al., 2009), or to cues 
that predict monetary losses in an instrumental context where 
they are avoidable (Schlund and Cataldo, 2010), there have also 
been null findings (see Delgado et al., 2008 for review), particu-
larly when attempting to isolate regions of the brain involved 
in loss aversion (Tom et al., 2007). This inconsistency extends 
to neuropsychological investigations, as patients with bilateral 
amygdala damage have been shown to be sensitive to monetary 
loss aversion (De Martino et al., 2010), in contrast to neuroimag-
ing findings (Tom et al., 2007), with these results demonstrating 
an overall deficit in amygdala patients in decisions under risk 
(Bechara et al., 1999; Brand et al., 2007). The current study adds 
to this literature by suggesting that in a Pavlovian aversive con-
ditioning session analogous to second-order conditioning, the 
expression of a conditioned response does not appear to depend 
on the amygdala.
A few important features of the Pavlovian aversive conditioning 
paradigm with monetary reinforcers may contribute to the discrep-
ancy in findings with respect to the amygdala results. First, unlike 
tasks that probe loss aversion via active decision-making processes 
(Bechara et al., 1999; Brand et al., 2007; De Martino et al., 2010), 
this paradigm involves passive learning of associations which are 
less salient in human experiments. Second, although this paradigm 
aimed to equate the intensity of both primary and secondary rein-
forcers used in this task (as supported by subjective ratings), this 
was done at a group, not individual level as the monetary loss was 
uniform across the study. Third, the differences in delivery of the 
reinforcer could have accounted for much of the observed changes 
in the amygdala. That is, shock is immediately delivered and per-
ceived through somatosensory pathways. In contrast, monetary loss 
did not physically take place till the end of the experiment and was 
conveyed visually. Perhaps the shock could have been accumulated 
in the experiment creating a “bank of shocks” to be delivered later. 
However, the intention of the experiment was to try to replicate 
previous instances of fear conditioning in humans. In addition, it 
is unclear how delayed reinforcement would affect the acquisition 
of an aversive response with either type of reinforcer. Finally, it is 
worth noting that the amygdala ROI was defined in an exploratory 
fMRI analysis and the neuropsychological investigation involved 
only one participant. More work is needed to fully understand 
the role of the amygdala in aversive conditioning with monetary 
losses, this study suggests important differences in the neural cir-
cuitry involved in the acquisition of fear from a biologically defined 
primary reinforcer (i.e., shock) and a socially defined secondary 
reinforcer (i.e., money).
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